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THE INABILITY OF CONGRESS TO IMPINGE ON STATE
POWER TO SET ELECTORAL AGE QUALIFICATIONS
MORRIS

D.

FORKOSCH*

power simply by statute to require the states
to permit 18-year olds and over to vote in all federal, state, and
local elections (assuming other permissible qualifications are met)?
Or is an amendment to the Constitution necessary to enable Congress
to fix, or itself to fix, such a minimum age? If the latter, then the former
is unconstitutional.
HAS CONGRESS TODAY

The initial approach to these questions begins with article I, § 2,
cl. 1 of the Constitution which empowers the States to set the qualifications of the voters although subject to the overriding power of Congress
under § 4, cl. 1 to fix the time, place, and manner of holding the
elections, as well as the power of the judiciary to examine the state's
qualifications in the light of other constitutional limitations and prohibitions.' Insofar as a voter's qualifications include all aspects other
than time, etc., there is no definition or description found, so that
interpretation of this constitutional term is required. The content historically and judicially to be given the term may be examined without
reference to amendments or conditions subsequent to 1789 (the ratification of the Constitution), and then looked at in the light of these
changes.
The conclusion reached is that Congress does not have power,
simply by statute, to lower the voting age to 18. The analysis by which
this view is reached treats these aspects: first, the Constitution's sections
and clauses are set forth and examined, with a tentative conclusion arrived at which is to be subjected to a more rigorous analysis; then we
proceed to the English background, the colonial background, and,
finally, the Constitutional Convention of 1787, with the initial negative
conclusion now so fortified.
* A.B., M.A., J.S.D., New York University; L.L.B., L.L.M., St. John's University;
M.S.Sc., Ph.D., New School for Social Research. Dr. Forkosch is presently a Professor
of Law at the Brooklyn Law School.
1 See, e.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964), and
also M. Forkosch, Constitutional Law 252 (2d ed. 1969). For illustrations of the court's
exercise of this power see discussion and cases below.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES INVOLVED
The 1970 Senate Amendment No. 545 to the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 19652 proposed to reduce the voting age of electors
otherwise qualified to 18; it was keyed to the fourteenth amendment's
§ 5 and the fifteenth amendment's § 2, both enforcement sections for
their respective first sections.8 However, what of article I, § 2, cl. 1,
as well as § 4, cl. 1? These three sections and several clauses, as well
as others,4 require a preliminary examination of their language in order
to understand the problems confronting the present statutory efforts to
reduce the voting age by national, uniform legislation.
Article I, § 2, cl. 1 states that Representatives shall be chosen "by
the People of the several States," and that "the electors in each State
shall have the Qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature."' Section 4, cl. 1 states that "The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed" by the state legislatures, "but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." It would appear, from a
juxtaposition of these two clauses, that three observations may be
immediately made. First, that when the Preamble opens with "We the
People of the United States," and now refers to the election of repre2 P.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, adopted by the Congress pursuant to its powers under § 5
of the fourteenth amendment and § 2 of the fifteenth amendment (see, e.g., § 9[b] of the
Act), the enforcement sections; the Act came before the 91st Congress for extension (it was
to expire August 6, 1970). In the Senate an amendment (No. 545), sponsored primarily by
Senator Edward Kennedy, sought to reduce the voting age for all federal, state, and local
elections to 18 as of January 1, 1971, and by a vote of 64-17 this was adopted (with other
amendments) in March, 1970. In the House the Rules Committee voted to send to
the floor a package including a rider (to the extension bill) lowering the voting age to 18,
and by a vote of 272-132 the lower body adopted this. The President thereafter, on June 22,
1970, signed the bill thereby increasing the possible electorate by about 11 million. Will they
vote, and even if they do, will they significantly alter the elections (e.g., the women's votes
after the nineteenth amendment)? For example, were the English elections of 1970 "influenced" when a Conservative was elected? What of those in Germany that same year?
3 See, e.g., M. Forkosch, Constitutional Law § 364 (2d ed. 1969). The second section of
the fourteenth amendment is discussed below, see note 25 et seq., with the third and
fourth being ignored as inapplicable here.
4 See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), holding the Georgia county unit
system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, but concluding
(majority opinion): "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the fifteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth
amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote." See also note 22, infra.
5 Senators, originally chosen by the state legislatures, are, of course, by virtue of the
seventeenth amendment, elected "by the people" of the States, and these electors are
qualified in the identical language as that quoted in the text.
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sentatives "by the People of the several States," it is the same people
who are involved but in two different capacities, i.e., as people having
two sovereigns to whom they owe allegiances and duties, from whom
they derive certain privileges, and against whom they may assert certain rights. It therefore follows that the people act in two election
capacities, but that the federal sovereignty has chosen to adopt as the
qualifications to be placed upon its voting people those which the state
sovereign has (constitutionally) chosen to adopt for its most numerous
legislative branch.' The "federal people" therefore have a right to
vote separate from that of the "state people," even though the former's
qualifications are adopted by those of the latter. But does this reasoning
not lead to the conclusion that the federal sovereignty therefore possesses the power at any time to nullify or alter these adopted qualifications? If these adoptions or qualifications were by statute there would
be no problem; but the Constitution requires amendments pursuant to
article V.7 While the adoption approach of § 2 is thus frozen, it does
not mean that some amendment cannot, expressly or impliedly, negate
a state's ability to formulate and apply one or more of the qualifications
which it would otherwise have the power to impose.
The second observation concerning the two clauses quoted above
is that the Founding Fathers used careful language to indicate the
affirmative powers expressly granted to the Congress in the § 4 clause
(even as to the express exception) and, by refraining from so granting
any or explicit powers, or making exceptions, in the declaratory § 2
clause, impliedly (and even expressly) rejected any Congressional
power in this respect. (Even the tenth amendment" a specifically reserves
to the States or the People any "powers not delegated to the United
States . . . .") Thirdly, that "Qualifications" of the electors is expressly
6 See, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662-64 (1884), and Wiley v. Sinkler,
179 U.S. 58, 62-4 (1900).
7 See, e.g., the analogous dilemma, and the answer so given, in Opinion of the Justices,
247 Mass. 583, 143 N.E. 142 (1924). On whether or not the so-far usual Congressional
method of proposing an amendment should be used, or the never-used one of a Constitutional Convention, both under article V of the Constitution, see, e.g., Forkosch, The Alternative Amending Clause in Article V: Reflections and Suggestions, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 1053
(1967).
7a This declaratory and hortatory amendment's reservation of powers becomes jejune
without the addition of judicial interpretation. For the present analysis, the argument may
be urged that without some express or definite and unequivocally implied delegation to the
federal government, the control over the voting age was so reserved. See Forkosch, Who
are the "People" in the Preamble to the Constitution?, 19 Case West. L. Rev. 644, 706-7
(1968).
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differentiated from the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections," and that the former may be said to allude to the substantive qualifications of electors while the latter has to do with the procedures
whereby the qualified electors will cast their votes;' further, that the
Constitution gives to Congress only a reserved power to alter these express procedures, and even then excepts therefrom one aspect, but that
as to the substantive qualifications does not permit Congress thereafter
to interfere, i.e., Congress has no power to enact a law having to do
with these substantive qualifications.
These comments on the use of "careful language" by the Founding Fathers are not limited to the cited provisions of the Constitution.
For example, article I, § 2, cl. 2 sets forth the requirements to "be" a
Representative and, as to age, makes 25 the minimum; article 2, § 3, cl.
3 makes the minimum age for one to "be" a Senator; and article II, § 1,
cl. 4 makes 35 the minimum to "be eligible" for President. (In effect,
therefore, one can be elected to Congress before reaching those ages
provided he waits to be sworn in, e.g., former Senator Rush D. Holt, of
West Virginia, who waited for six months, but not so for the Presidency). What of the Vice-President? What of Justices of the Supreme
Court? Are statutes able to provide for their minimum ages? Statutes
did not and do not. However, a constitutional amendment took care of
the Vice-President, i.e., the twelfth amendment's last sentence provides,
"But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall
be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States." Quaere:
does this mean that a statute requiring Supreme Court Justices to be at
least 35 would be unconstitutional? All of which again permits the
conclusion that Congress has no power to reduce the voting age requirements.
These several conclusions appear to be fortified by reference to
article I, § 8, cl. 18, which grants to Congress power to make all necessary and proper laws to execute "the foregoing [seventeen] Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States . . . ." But, what power is vested in the Congress by
art. I, §§ 2 and 4, as above quoted? And if none as to the substantive
8 In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 660 et seq. (1884), Justice Miller gives an
extensive account of the power of Congress under this provision and illustrates by reference
to various statutes, e.g., that of 1842 requiring representatives to be elected from districts,
of 1872 requiring elections on one day in the year. These illustrations indicate the procedural nature of the Congressional power.
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qualifications, then the Necessary & Proper Clause does not apply. Nor
do other constitutional clauses or amendments suffice to change this
conclusion, as it may be urged that Congress and the States have, many
times since 1789, been offered the opportunity to alter this division of
substantive and procedural powers and, impliedly, have rejected it. To
illustrate, the twelfth amendment, while referring to the national "electors" in the Electoral College, might still have been a vehicle for change
in the voting electors here examined; so, too, could later amendments,
e.g., the fourteenth, fifteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twentysecond, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth, all dealing with
the political and voting aspects of the federal or state governments and
yet all by-passing the question.'
What of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments' enforcement
sections, to which Senate No. 545 is keyed? The fifteenth (plus nineteenth) amendment prevents federal or state abridgment of the right
of federal citizens to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" (or of "sex"), and it is these substantive qualifications on the right to vote, and no others, which are removed from state
power. As later disclosed, every one of the original thirteen states had
substantive qualifications on the right to vote which not only included,
e.g., religion or property, but also, whether by constitution, statute, or
custom, the above-quoted items. All these and others were not touched
by the ratification of the Constitution and its art. I clauses, and not even
the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments sufficed to remove all substantive state disqualifications; the twenty-fourth amendment, ratified in
1964, was required in order to remove the poU-tax.10 Which, in effect,
supports the conclusion that from the mass of state disqualifications, or
substantive requirements, on the right to vote, specific and limited constitutional amendments utilized a piecemeal approach, not a wholesale
condemnation or withdrawal into the federal power, so that any federal
rejection of or reduction in age as a requirement also requires a specific
constitutional amendment.
9 However, § 2 of the fourteenth amendment may have changed all that is implied in
these general observations. To date there is no Congressional or judicial indication of the
possibility of such a change. Inaction may therefore give rise to interpretation that such a

possibility is not present. For a discussion of § 2 see text keyed to note 25 et seq., infra.
10 From applying as to federal elections, but as to state ones see Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), utilizing the Equal Protection Clause of the four.
teenth amendment to strike these down.
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The fourteenth amendment's § 5 must be read in conjunction with
not only § 1 but also with the other intermediate sections. However,
these intermediate sections have generally been ignored and especially
so with respect to age. It is the first section, which contains the Privileges & Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause, which has received the court's primary attention,
especially with respect to equal protection in voting. For example, one
argument used to support Senate No. 545 was that recent decisions had
"provide[d] a solid constitutional basis for legislation by Congress in
this area,""1 e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, upholding § 4(e) of the 1965
Voting Rights Act.12 That Act was passed for the primary purpose of
preventing any state from denying a federal citizen his right "to vote
on account of race or color,"' 8 today's already classic equal protection
violation, although literacy and the poll tax were also included within
its prohibitions.' 4 Other cases relied on by the proponents of No. 545
prevented a state from withholding the franchise from residents merely
because they were servicemen, 15 or in school district elections merely
because they were bachelors, owned no property, or had no children
attending within the district," or by imposing a poll tax. 7 In all these
cases the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection Clause was held to
apply. In Carrington the majority felt the state's prohibition "imposes
an invidious discrimination, ' ' "s as they also did in Kramer," and in
11 Testimony by Senator Kennedy before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, reprinted in 116 Cong. Rec. S3057 (March 5, 1970).
12 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Sec. 4(e) prevented a state from denying one's right to vote
because of inability to pass a literacy test in English where he had completed the sixth
primary grade in, e.g., Puerto Rico. On whether or not the English language is a requirement
for voting, i.e., "read and speak the English language," see Jimenez v. Nuff, - U.S. -, 90
S. Ct. 1245 (1970), granting certiorari to determine this question where the Washington
Constitution so required and the 1965 Voting Rights Act outlaws "any test of the ability
to read, write, understand or interpret any matter" unless the test is uniformly administered.
13 Sec. 2, repeated in the sections and subdivisions following save for § 4(e) of the
1965 Voting Rights Act.
14 Respectively § 4(e), supra note 11, and § 10 (on the poll tax), the former being
keyed to the fourteenth amendment, in its subd. (1), and the latter, in its subd. (b), to the
enforcement sections of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
15 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
16 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
17 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
18 380 U.S. at 96, the court also quoting from Lassiter v. Northamptom Election Board,
360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) that "The States have long been held to have broad powers to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised."
19 395 U.S. at 625, that "Appellant agrees that the States have the power to impose
reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the availability of the ballot,"
citing Carrington,supra note 15, and Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
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Harper they felt that a state violated the clause "whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard."2
Although the proponents of No. 545 did not cite Gray v. Sanders,2 1 that
case rejected a state's county unit system as a basis for counting votes
also because of the Equal Protection Clause.22
What comes through from these and other cases is the feeling
that whatever the Constitution may have permitted in 1789, amendments
and changes have produced different results today ;23 and that when
these amendments and changes do apply, then the federal government
(through congressional, executive, or judicial action) has an obligation so to determine and effectuate. 24 Thus sex was ousted by the nineteenth amendment, and the imposition of a poll-tax on the right to vote
was negated by the 1868 (fourteenth) and subsequent amendments;
color, too, was unable to be so used. Residence, however, is still upheld
as a requirement, even though not able to be unreasonably formulated
and applied. Where does age fit in? As disclosed later, twenty-one is
the universally applied age at the time of the Constitution's ratification,
and even the fourteenth amendment twice mentions this figure in its § 2.
An examination of this section gives weight to the conclusion that Congress has no statutory power to lower the voting age.
Section 2 of the fourteenth amendment sought to safeguard the
right of the newly.freed Blacks to their privileges and immunities as
federal citizens;25 included in these was the right to vote26 which he
20 383 U.S. at 666. At 668 the opinion also stated: "But we must remember that the
interest [i.e., constitutional power] of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the
power to fix qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's
ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process."
21 372 U.S. 364 (1963).
22 See also note 4, supra, on this case. At 380 the majority opinion also contained this
language: "Yet when Senators are chosen, the seventeenth amendment states the choice must
be made 'by the people.' Minors, felons, and other classes may be excluded."
23 See, e.g., Forkosch, Who Are the "People" in the Preamble to the Constitution?, 19
Case West. L. Rev. 644, 711 (1968), querying, concerning the effect of judicial decisions
and amendments on "People," "While never directly amended, was not the Preamble indirectly so changed? Is not the earlier interpretation by the Supreme Court now to be
altered? These indirect judicial amendments to the Constitution, so as to follow the intent
of the people, have precedent and even necessity behind them ...."
24 See, e.g., the writer's opinion that the language of the Preamble mandates judicial
action "to secure the Blessings of Liberty" therein contained, in Forkosch, Does "Secure the
Blessings of Liberty" In the Preamble Mandate Judicial Action?, 1970 Law and the Social
Order -.
25 See, e.g., M. Forkosch, Constitutional Law Chap. XVII (2d ed. 1969). Briefly, article
IV of the Constitution safeguards the privileges and immunities of state citizens when going
into other states where these other states grant them to their own citizens; but if not so
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could now have and seek to enforce against recalcitrant states.27 As
Thaddeus Stevens assured the House just before the proposed amendment was voted upon, "The second section ...worked the enfranchisement of the colored man," 2 although Senator Jacob Howard, of Michigan, who presented the House's proposal to the Senate on behalf of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction and so made the major expository
address on the unamended section,29 "acknowledge[d] . . . that this
section of the amendment does not recognize the authority of the United
States over the question of suffrage in the several States at all; nor does
it recognize, much less secure, the right of suffrage in the colored
race. ' The finally ratified § 2 contains two sentences. The first sentence makes the flat declaratory statement that Representatives are to
be apportioned among the states "according to their respective [whole]
granted, then the incoming state citizens cannot claim any. The fourteenth amendment's
§ 1, sentence 1, enunciated a federal (not state) citizenship in those born (or naturalized)
here, as well as state citizenship where they resided; and now its second sentence prevented
any state from depriving these federal citizens of their (federal) privileges and immunities.
28 This "elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution
of the State in which it is to be exercised," was so included within art. IV, § 2, cl. l's
privileges and immunities which Justice Washington defined in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.
C.C. 371, Fed. Cas. No. 3, 230, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823). After the ratification of
the fourteenth amendment its Privilege & Immunities Clause was interpreted in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 75-76 (1873) by quoting all of the earlier definition.
27 Even prior to the amendment's proposal by Congress in 1866 that body had
brought up, by a portion of the Republican Party, the issue of Negro voting in the District
of Columbia. For example, in 1864 Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, declaimed on the
"clothing [of] the colored citizen with the most exalted of all the rights and privileges
of citizenship in America," and his colleague, Senator Charles Sumner, a radical egalitarian,
also gave thanks for having "at last in the national capital equality before the law." A. Avins,
ed., The Reconstruction Amendments' Debates 74, 75 (1967) (hereafter Avins, Reconstruction), giving selected text material from the Congressional Globe. (The amendment
sponsored by Sumner lost by a vote of 18-20).
28 Id. at 238. Although the quoted language is taken out of context it fairly represents
this, and the others' views.
29 The House's version of the present second section was slightly altered but, for the
present purposes, there was no significant change. It may even be said that the amendment's
enacted language is identical with that originally proposed by the House. On the House
language see Id. at 218.
30 Id. at 2766. Howard was personally in favor of extending the franchise to the
Negroes, if only in a "restricted, qualified" way, but feared rejection of the amendment by
the States. He therefore assured them that "The second section leaves the right to regulate
the elective franchise still with the States, and does not meddle with that right." See also
the Joint Committee's Report, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., dated June 8, 1866, as found in Avins,
Reconstruction at 94, wherein that body expressed at greater lengths the facts and conclusions voiced by Howard.
It may be commented that the concern for the sovereignty of the southern states is
found expressed in the reassurances being given that the Negroes were not being given a
"right," i.e., the mere enacting of the amendment did not, in and of itself, thereby permit
the Negro to vote; he now had to satisfy the qualifications set by the State, e.g., a poll-tax.
In other words, those reassuring the South winked at the ability of the states to control the
voting qualifications and thereby disenfranchise the Negro.
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numbers" of persons, excluding Indians not taxed. The second sentence
qualifies this for those elections where a federal President, Vice-President, or Representatives are to be chosen, as well as where any state's
Executive or Judicial officers, or members of the Legislature are to be
elected, i.e., generally, for all federal and state elections; in these elections, "when the right to vote.., is denied to any of the male inhabitants
of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged... , the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.""
There are several observations which may be made concerning this
language. The term "abridged" refers to "the right to vote," and does
not apply to the qualifications of those persons seeking the franchise;
thus it is to be limited to situations where, e.g., a state official falsely
registers one, or permits illegal voting to occur, or takes a bribe, or
makes a false return, or neglects any duty required by federal or state
law." The references to "male" and "twenty-one" do come within the
substantive qualifications which, in art. I, § 2, cl. 1, have been previously examined. But, as noted and later to be further discussed, these
substantive qualifications included and today partially still include
items such as property, religion, color, sex, tax, literacy, residence and
age. It may be queried why only sex and age were included in § 2's enumeration. The answer is that only these two were uniformly found in
not only the original states but also those admitted to the 1860's;35 further, that as to the others, there was not only a variety of treatment but
also definite national and local efforts then being made to erase one or
more of them. In addition, these "male" and "twenty-one" requirements
were present in the earlier federal government's own Northwest Ordinance of 1787, i.e., when "five thousand free male inhabitants, of full
31 Of course "male" has been superseded by the nineteenth amendment, and "at least"
should be inserted before "twenty-one" (or else "or over" after it). As to citizenship see,
e.g., M. Forkosch, Constitutional Law § 259 (2d ed. 1969).
32 This language, here illustrative only, is found in the Reconstruction legislation, e.g.,
16 Stat. 140, 144, 254 (1870), and for additional references see M. Forkosch, Constitutional Law 171 n.9, and 371 et seq. (2d ed. 1969).
33 See, e.g., F. Thorpe, A Constitutional History of the American People 1776-1850 (2
vols. 1898) (hereafter Thorpe, Constitutional), in which he gives a four-page table of the
qualifications found during that period (at II, 476-79), and refers to the "Agitation for
woman suffrage [which] began about 1845 in New York . . . " At 481. The table at I,
93-96, shows that between 1776 and 1800 the qualifications of all the states were 21 and male.
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age," were present in the district they could elect their own representatives. 4 It is therefore understandable that such inclusions would occur
when all governments agreed that these were requirements coming
within the constitutional "qualifications" within the power of the states
to control.
This last is important, i.e., "within the power of the states to control." The implication is that the federal government has no ability to
determine sex or age but must leave this to the states, in their discretion.
However, where the states voluntarily surrender all or a portion of their
discretion, there can be no objection. The nineteenth amendment so did,
i.e., "male" was removed when three-fourths of the state legislatures
voluntarily ratified that amendment. Pari passu, if one of these two
qualifications required a constitutional amendment to change it, then
does not the other so require?
Another thought intrudes. Section 2's built-in qualification in its
second sentence on the apportionment stated in the first sentence has a
penalty clause where a denial of the right to vote occurs today when
anyone is (at least) twenty-one. While a state may therefore lower its
age requirement to eighteen, does it have power so to increase it to
twenty-two? The language of § 2 must be construed to permit this, with
the state thereby voluntarily agreeing to a reduction in the basis of its
representation8 5 In other words, § 2 does not prevent a state from increasing or decreasing the age required for voting. But if Congress has
the power to decrease, then why not the coin-face power to increase?
Which, if permitted, willy-nilly gives Congress power automatically to
decrease one or more of the states' representation!
This examination of the applicable Constitutional clauses supports
the view expressed at the outset, that Congress has no present statutory
power to mandate a lowering of the voting age to 18. However, what of
the historic background of these clauses? Does history shed any light
84 There were also required a freehold in 50 acres of land, citizenship in one of the
states, and two years' residence. See. 9 of the Ordinance.
35 The 39th Congress, which proposed the fourteenth amendment, of course did not
have all this in mind. They desired to penalize those states preventing one from voting on
account of color or race and "Such a [penalty] provision would be in its nature gentle
and persuasive ...
" Joint Committee Report, supra note 30. See also the statement of
Senator Oliver H. P. T. Morton, of Indiana, in 1868, that this penalty was "an obvious
justice that no reasonable man for a moment could deny ...."-Avins,Reconstruction,
supra note 27, at 288.
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upon the subject? We turn first to the English, and then to the American,
backgrounds.
THE ENGLISH BACKGROUND
To what extent, if any, does age play a part in the popular branch"6
of the government during early and late England, so that sixteenth and
seventeenth century emigrants would take with them a background of
requirements and limitations which included this as a factor? There are
several historical aspects other than age which may be profitably examined, with this latter occupying a minor role in each such other aspect,
i.e., it seems to be the accepted norm for 21 to be the minimum age for
an elector. All these aspects tie in to disclose that 21 is a line of demarcation for many purposes, and that undoubtedly it was that age
which the American colonists brought with them to the New World.
THE ANGLO-SAXON

PERIOD

To start with, the expulsion of all Roman functionaries from Britain, created a vacuum which was filled by invading hosts, internal feuds,
and the necessitous militarization of all tribes and races. There were
"military colonies," as Dr. Gneist terms them, which arose and eventually formed the Anglo-Saxon mold for the future nation. In this new
nation the military system "was founded on the duty of all to bear
arms," and the concomitant acquisition of land by the victors. 7 Parliament's origins may conceivably be found in the Anglo-Saxon town-moot,
the next higher burgh-moot, etc., the local ones being participatory
(comprised of freemen and cultivators of the folk-land) 8 while the superior ones generally become representative (these were usually appointed). The highest such body was the witenagemot which "made laws,
imposed taxes, concluded treaties, . . . and even assumed to elect and
depose the king himself."3 9 Taylor states that "The Supreme powers
... were vested in the king and the witan ....
In every act of legisla36 The House of Lords, and its predecessors, are not "elected" as is the House of Commons, and while the minimum age for membership in both Houses is 21, Ency. Brit. XVII,
380 (14th ed. 1969), it is the age of the electors for the members of the lower House which
is of present interest.
87 R. Gneist, The English Parliament 8 (transl. R. Shee, 1886) (hereafter Gneist).
88 The original "assemblies of the whole people" which were "found grouped" around
the king were changed as "there comes into being a more restricted measure of participation" so that ultimately "the general assemblies of the people cease, in the main." Id. at 13-14.
39 Ency. Brit. XX, 838 (13th ed. 1926) ; these highest and lowest (representative) moots
may conceivably be analogized respectively to the present Houses of Commons and of Lords.
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tion the right of the witan to advise and consent was invariably recog' 40
nized.
To the extent that the crown appointees and the others were direct
advisers, etc., it does not make sense to have callow youths chosen for
such a purpose; the smaller assemblies, however, probably aped the
procedure described by Tacitus; the eldest opened, and "then each
one speaks according as distinguished by age, family, renown in war,
or eloquence," 41 although this circle kept narrowing by virtue of required land-ownership, status, birth, etc., and age and war service were
among the casualties. There thus seems to be, at first, no requirement
that a minimum age of 21 be attained before one could enter the local
councils, although the weight accorded youthful opinion varied; if a
man could fight, and perhaps obtain spoils (e.g., land) and so become
established, he undoubtedly could participate in these general local assemblies. Historically, therefore, the pre-Norman era probably had at
least local universal suffrage, albeit limited to (fighting) males possessing other qualifications.
THE NORMAN CONQUEST-HENRY

III's SEVERAL "AGEs"

The conquest of Britain in 1066 eventually led to feudalism,
status, and the ultimate, albeit not initial, demise of any form of assembly of the general population.' In the first years of his reign, William
consulted with and used the witan, e.g., "to accomplish a complete severance of ecclesiastical from temporal business by the creation of distinct courts and councils, in which the church could judge and legislate
upon its own affairs without secular interference."4 3 William's absolutism, despite baronial dissension, later rejected the witenagemot in
favor of his own personal council of officials, although some forms of
national council were maintained. The new council was later continued
and became known as the curia (concilium) regis, although its jurisdiction was eventually limited to advice of a judicial" nature (To what
40

H. Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the English Constitution I, 186 (2 vols. 1904)

(hereafter Taylor).
41 Quoted in Gneist, supra note 37, at 26.
42 Although William the Conqueror did, at first, continue the witan, Taylor, supra
note 40, at , 239 and 260, and he also had "a very deep speech with" them.
43 Taylor, supra note 40, at 1, 260.
44 "Under the Norman kings the ["legislative and judicial functions and the voting of
taxation or supply"] were undifferentiated. At a sitting of the curia regis (king's court or
council), petitions might be considered and disposed of by what would be called a judicial
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extent is the present House of Lords [through its committee] effectively
so limited today?) ; and especially in the exercising of such a function
can it be said that age was a most important factor.
The curia's dependence upon the king's will is also shown by the
aftermath of Magna Carta's security council of twenty-five nobles45
which further disclosed the immediate disregard of any grouping which
was independent of the king. It may be noted, however, that the need of
Henry III for money to wage war eventually required him, in 1254, to
ask his barons to designate and send up two knights from each shire to
consult with him, i.e., representatives (of the people) meeting in a central assembly, with these representatives undoubtedly being of "full
age." And it may be further noted that in 1275 Edward I utilized the
same method, with the knights now chosen by the freeholders (who, by
definition, usually"6 had to be 21), and including two burgesses from
every leading population center, which seemingly begins the parliamentary form of government.4 7
The Great Charter of 1215 is itself of present interest, as is the
accession of Henry III to the throne. The Charter uses terms such as
"full age" (Art. 2, referring to the inheritance upon the death of an
earl and others, and if "at his death his heir be of full age") and "under age" (Arts. 3, 4), and also refers to "when he becomes of age"
(Art. 5). One year after its acceptance King John died; his eldest son,
Henry, born October 1, 1207, was then but nine years old,4" and so the
barons chose a regent to rule for him. In 1223 the Pope declared Henry,
although only sixteen, of age and competent to govern ;49 certain authorities speak of the latter attaining his "majority" 50 or coming "of
determination, or by an order to a sheriff to see that right was done, or by a general order
which partook of the nature of legislation." Ency. Brit. XVII, 376 (14th ed. 1969).
45 See list in J. Holt, Magna Carta 338 (1965).
The next sentence is supported by
Ency. Brit. XX, 839, n.1 (13th ed. 1926).
46 This is the general approach adopted here although minors could hold land in freehold, as in Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 E.R. 377 (1608), suing, if need be, by his
prochain ami. And a freeholder did not per se satisfy all qualifications for voting, e.g., it
might be less than the required amount.
47 Ency. Brit. XX, 840, n.1, and see also Id. XVH, 383 (14th ed. 1969), that in the
Norman French period of the Middle Ages individual writs summoned two persons from
each shire and borough. Additionally, by definition a "freeholder" had to be 21.
48 Ency. Brit. XI, 361 (14th ed. 1969) ; see also Gneist, supra note 37, at 87, as well as
W. Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England II, 29 (4th ed. 1896) (hereafter Stubbs),
whose superficially equivocal language nevertheless agrees, although cf.Taylor, supra note 40,
at 394, that he "had just completed his tenth year."
49 Ency. Brit. XIII, 282 (13th ed. 1926), and Taylor, supra note 40, at 396, n.6.
50 E.g., B. Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England 330 (1960)
(hereafter Lyon).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

age"'" in 1225, when Henry was only eighteen; but it seems to be uniformly agreed that at the beginning of 1227, when he was not yet
twenty, "he complete [d] his emancipation," 52 attained "his majority," 53
"declared himself of age,"5 4 and was also "again proclaimed of age,""
and, while not dismissing his advisers, began to assume increasing degrees of personal control;56 five years later, in 1232, when Henry was
twenty-five, his "personal rule" begins.57 Regardless of the accuracy of
the various dates in Henry's life, there is no confusion about the fact
that at least for him the terms "of age," "full age," "majority," and
"emancipation" refer to different periods in his life beginning with
sixteen and continuing into twenty-five. 8
THE COMMON LAW

The term "full age" is thus of historical ambiguity. Henry III
did not initiate this vagueness and uncertainty; he did, however, continue it. Nevertheless, by the dawn of the common law, as disclosed by
Coke's Littleton, some degree of definitiveness became the norm, at least
as applied to land: "For when such tenant dyeth, the lord shall have the
land holden of him until the age of the heire of 21 yeares; the which is
called full age, because such heire by intendment of the law is not able
to doe such knight's service before his age of 21 years... ."" The comments then state of the French "Pleine age," that "Full age regularly
is one and twenty yeares," and disclose further that "A woman hath
51 E.g., T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 23 (5th ed. 1956).
52 Taylor, supra note 40, at 396, 397.
53 Stubbs, supra note 48, at 39.
54 Gneist, supra note 37, at 90.
55 Ency. Brit. XIII, 282 (13th ed. 1926); see also F. Pollock and F. Maitland, The
History of English Law I, 198, 523 (2d ed., repr. 1959), who speak of his "full age" when
referring to a "permanent, center tribunal" held by Henry, and to an action for land in
which it is alleged that the king is plaintiff's warrantor, whereupon "the action must remain
in suspense until the king is of full age."
56 Taylor, supra note 40, at 396, mentions "personal direction."
57 Gneist, supra note 37, at 90; Lyon, supra note 50, at 339; Ency. Brit., supra note 55,
using the term for 1227, and Taylor, supra note 40, at 397, using "personal government" for
1234, and just prior thereto speaking of "actually attempted to govern alone."
58 Writing of the Dublin and Waterford craft gilds in the 16th century, Prof. Lipson
states that a citizen was responsible for his apprentice's wrongdoing "as he would for his
son if he were of age, that is to say, if he can count twelve pence, as is the law of citizens
and burgesses." E. Lipson, The Economic History of England I, 311 (3 vols. 1949). His
footnote includes: "At Ipswich proof of age was determined by the ability to measure cloth
and count money: Bacon, Annals of Ipswich, 70."
59 Coke's Commentary upon Littleton, Lib. 2, Chap. 4, § 103, 74b (London 1775) concerning "Knight's Service;" the only change made here is to replace the original initial "F'
by "s."
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seven ages for severall purposes appointed to her by law" and that "A
man also by the law for severall purposes hath divers ages assigned
unto him . . . . 0 While the first quotation is given to disclose one type
of "full age," i.e., that concerning land, the first comment refers to the
term as being "regularly" 21; which means, pari passu, that the other
comments, while disclosing various ages for women and for men, do
not contradict the fact that 21 is "regularly" the "full age" and so to
be considered unless the contrary appears.
Pollock and Maitland, in writing their famous work, agree at the
outset that "There is more than one 'full age,'" but then feel that
"Gradually however the knightly majority is becoming the majority of
the common law,"'" and that "by this time," i.e., in Bracton's text, what
is "regarded as the normal full age . . . [is] one and twenty years."
They then opine that "the only line of general importance is drawn at
the age of one and twenty; and infant-the one technical word that we
have as a contrast for the person of full age-stands equally well for
the new-born babe and the youth who is in his twenty-first year."62 One
other common law aspect is pertinent. The two authors, after stating
that "the knightly majority is becoming" the common law one, later
discuss the pleading and proof at a trial; now they write that the sheriff
chooses four knights, who in turn choose twelve others, and that a
"grand assize is composed of [such] twelve lawful knights," with a
"petty assize or an ordinary jury, [being composed of] twelve free and
lawful men of the neighbourhood . . . ."" Since the former (knights)
are twenty-one or over, and the sheriff chooses the petty assizes, it would
be presumptuous for this latter to choose younger men, i.e., infants, to
decide what the older had charged; and since it is "free and lawful"
men who are here mentioned, the presumption must attach that 21 was
also a minimum so to serve. It is not much of a jump from this age re60 Id. at 78b. For the man this is given: "twelve yeares to take the oath of allegeance
in the tome or leet, fourteene yeares to consent to mariage, fourteene yeares for the heire
in socage to choose his gardian, and fourteene yeares is also accounted his age of discretion,
fifteene yeares for the lord to have aid pur faire fitz chivaler, under one and twenty to be
in ward to the lord by knights service, under fourteene to be in ward to gardian in socage,
fourteene to be out of ward of gardian in socage, and one and twenty to be out of ward
of gardian in chivalrie and to alien his lands goods and chattels."
61 F. Pollock and F. Maitland, The History of English Law I, 438 (2d ed. repr. 1959).
62 Id. at 439, citing for the first quotation Bracton, n.275b, and for the second citing and
quoting the seven ages of women, supra note 60, where the ages of man are given. The
authors use the term full age at various other places, e.g., II, 443, 639, 640, and so the reader
must assume a continuation of their earlier opinion.
63 Id. at 621. See also Id. at 645.
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quirement to serve and vote on a petty jury, to that of serving and voting
as an elector; the two have much in common.
PARLIAMENT AND ITS ELECTORS

Self-government by those so able (in years and otherwise), which
had somewhat existed in differing modes prior to William the Conqueror, e.g., by assent, re-appeared in various and effective forms in
the nation and in the localities even before the statute of Henry IV in
1406. For example, by Arts. 12 and 14 of Magna Carta not only did
John agree not to levy scutage or aid "except by the common counsel
of our realm," but to summon his greater barons "individually by our
letters," and separately to "summon generally through our sheriffs and
bailiffs all those who hold of us in chief for a fixed date . . . [and]
state the reason for the summons." In the Parliaments held later that
century the writs summoning the various lords, bishops, and others were
highly restricted and changed with the decades.64 Eventually, however,
elections replaced designations, and it is then that the composition of
the electors' ages becomes relevant.
On the local scene a major problem of electoral qualification arises
because of the unavailability of early local records and, more importantly, the domination and application of local usage and custom, the
latter "render[ing] anything like a perfect generalization, even upon
sufficient data, almost impossible." 65 However, some background, even
though involving national requirements, illustrates and, perhaps, may
give a clue as to the age qualification locally and nationally. For example, in 1372 a parliamentary ordinance forbade "the election of
lawyers and exclud [ed] the sheriffs from candidature,"6 6 while in 1376
a petition was dismissed by the King which requested "that the knights
may be chosen by common election from the better folk of the shire,
and not merely nominated by the sheriff without due election ....
Because of a variety of evils resulting from the system then in force,
the Act of 14066" now required, inter alia, "that the election shall be
See, e.g., discussion by Stubbs, supra note 48, III, Chap. XX.
Taylor, supra note 40, at 473, then quoting from Stubbs, supra note 48, 1I1, 419-20.
Stubbs, supra note 48, III, 413. See also Id. II, 445. At III, 263, the author writes that
"Edward's ordinance against the choice of lawyers had remained a dead letter ...
67 Id. 1I, 414.
68 7 Hen. IV, c. 15, Statutes, ii, 156. For background reasons for the statute see, e.g.,
Stubbs, supra note 48, I1, 264, 420-21, and also 423.
64
65
66
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made in full county court by [all] the persons present," who included
not only those called for the election but also those separately and independently summoned for the judicial work of the court, e.g., suitors,
jurors, and anyone else then in the courtroom, and these, too, "shall
69
attend to the election.
Regardless, the succeeding monarch restricted the electors and their
choices to residents within their county, city, or borough,70 and in 1430,
because of the "great attendance by people of small substance and no
value, whereof every of them pretended a voice equivalent, as to such
elections, with the most worthy knights and squires resident," the shortlived democracy was limited by a property requirement, i.e., 40s.7
This aped the requirement which limited the class of those qualified to
serve on juries" but, even when "in theory the right of election was so
free that every person who attended the county court might vote, in
practice the privilege was not valued . . . ."" The exercise of the franchise locally thus became a matter for local regulation, although general legislation sought to remove demonstrated evils; but the local
records are not available. There appears to be overlapping, and it is
custom more than statute which is followed. While the elections are
eventually "becoming direct and primary . . . it is improbable that
any completely new system of franchise was introduced in the sixteenth
century . . . ."" Which, in effect, rejects any less than "full age" or
21 as one electoral qualification.
With the
1509) the age
even though a
illustrated by

creation of the Tudor Dynasty by Henry VII (1485factor as an electoral requirement is still greatly clouded,
greater degree of self-government appears. This latter is
local and financial administration, highway regulation,

69 Stubbs, supra note 48, III, 417 and 419. Bishop Stubbs also refers to the diminishing
importance of these county courts since the thirteenth century; see also 418, n.2.
70 1 Hen. V., c. 1, Statutes ii, 170..
71 8 Hen. VI., c. 7, Statutes ii, 243. This was that only residents possessed of a freehold worth 40s. a year could vote for these two knights (see note 67 and text, supra), with
the additional requirement that a majority thereof decided the election. See also Ency. Brit.
XVII, 384 (14th ed. 1969), that this 40s. requirement was the sole one until 1832, until
which year "the franchise was regulated by local custom." For the American like fears of
the lower class dominating the government, see discussion infra, notes 182-3.
72 Stubbs, supra note 48, III, 265. On the election of members by twelve electors
"forming a jury," see 432, and giving references to other localities so doing.
73 Id. at 421.
74 Id. at 433, who then proceeds to "briefly indicate the several theories or customs
which are found in working [sic] when our knowledge of the subject begins."
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and the care of the poor.7" It is, however, the need of Henry VIII (15091547) for financial and local support in his aborted war with France and
then the continuing fight with the Pope, that led to Parliamentary power
and authority, even though shortly after his death, with Mary (15531558) succeeding Edward VI (1547-1553), the Catholic Restoration
occurred. Now the "Reconciliation," Parliament's retrogressive conduct
in "humbly acknowledging their sin of spiritual defection, and receiving absolution from the hands of Cardinal Pole . . . led the way back
to the Papacy, but the esteem and confidence of the nation in them was
uprooted." 7 6 With Elizabeth's (1558-1603) succession to the throne of
Mary, the Anglican State-Church replaced that of Rome, and the kingship re-assumed power theretofore relinquished. This is somewhat shown
by the Queen's rebuke to Commons in 1571 to "meddle with no matters of state but such as should be propounded to them," and in 1593
informing them that their only privilege was in voting yes or no and
not "to speak every man what he listeth or what cometh unto his brain
to utter," 7 although such language resulted from problems connected
with the raising of funds through monopolistic grants. But Parliament's
importance is not to be denigrated, for "at important crises the Crown
now seeks to exercise an influence over elections."7 8
The Crown's desire to control the members of Parliament seeps
down to their base, i.e., those whom they represent. The narrower this
base the easier to influence. Until 1832 who were the electors from the
inception of and during the reign of the Tudors? Parliamentary representation, which at first was by royal designation later was accorded
geographical entities, e.g., towns, counties, shires, boroughs, and institutions (e.g., universities), did not become truly elective until the last
century. As already seen, the limitations placed upon the right of a person to vote were numerous, and the land and financial requirements
were so onerous as to narrow the base considerably, e.g., as late as 1831
reform bills were introduced which, by the time of final passage the
following year, increased the eligible voters from slightly over 400,000
to nearly double; and yet this was still but a small proportion of the
75 See Gneist, supra note 37, at 181-4.
76

Id. at 189. On the rise of the Privy Council, see 192-4.

Quoted in M. Forkosch, Antitrust and the Consumer 363, n.24 (1956).
Gneist, supra note 37, at 196. See also Ency. Brit. XVII, 378 (14th ed. 1969) : "The
fact that the Lords' journals began in 1509 and the Commons' journals in 1547 is significant.
It shows the increasing importance of Parliament under the Tudors, and especially under
Henry VII."
77
78
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total population of over ten million,79 so that by 1852 England and
Wales had electors numbering 322,619 freeholders, 23,097 copyholders, 21,104 leaseholders, 99,019 tenants, and 488,920 as borough
electors." It is only by 1858 that the qualifications of £600 and £300
ground-rent for Parliamentary members of counties and boroughs, introduced a century earlier, are abolished,8 ' and the succeeding reforms
free the citizen-voter from all civil duties to the point where Dr. Gneist
sorrowfully concludes that "From this time forward there is no principle which could be placed in opposition to any right of vote, not even
the suffrage in the case of women and minors."8 2 He was, of course, incorrect then as to age,88 although since the 1969 Representation of the
People Act, the voting age is 18. And this legislation in effect supports
the ultimate conclusion of Congressional impotency, for if the United
States, as England, did not have a written and limiting constitution,
then Congress, without more, could likewise so do.
CONCLUSIONS

The Examination of the pre-Norman era has permitted the probable conclusion that age, i.e., 21, did not necessarily count as a limiting factor in the make-up of the local councils. Nevertheless, the
formulation and application of the common law from William the Conqueror on indicates strongly that 21, as a serious dividing line for
79 Ency. Brit. XVII, 378 (14th ed. 1969), Table II, showing this to be 4.4% of the
electorate as a percentage of the population aged 20 and over, but increasing steadily so
that by 1931 it becomes 96.9%, and by 1964 is 96.2%. See also note 82, infra, on footnote
to table.
80 Gneist, supra note 37, at 335-9, See also Id. at 352 on "the Reform Bill in favour of
parliamentary franchise [which] summoned only £10 householders." At 361-2 Dr. Gneist
gives other financial limitations, at 363 gives a footnote for page 362 concerning the dropping of the £10 qualification, and at 365 gives the figures for the electorate down to the
third reform bill of 1884-5.
81 Id. at 341.
82 Id. at 371, speaking of the consequences he attributes to the law of 1869 for assessing
the poor-rate, i.e., that the occupier of a house "is to have the right of vote, whether he pay
the tax himself or through his landlord, provided that somebody pay" (at 370). This
language is continued in the second edition (1887) at 434, which is re-written by A. Keane.
See also note 83, in ra.
83 See Ency. Brit. XVII 384 (14th ed. 1969), that "In 1918 only two qualifications were
recognized, residence and the occupation of business premises of £10 a year," but also
giving a table of electorate growth between 1831 and 1964 (see note 79, supra) which
states, in a footnote, that "Persons under 21 have no vote . . . ." This, of course, is indicative of the continuing fact of this qualification, to the point where it is so much a matter of
common understanding and acceptance that it is deemed known to all without the necessity
of qualifying language (on which see also the colonial and other situation understood by
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, infra note 135, et seq.).
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major purposes, must be applied to those selected and later elected as
representatives, and, analogous to the jurors, their electors must also
have been of that age. This last conclusion is strengthened when note
is taken of the successive eliminations of voting qualifications into the
present, without any imposition of an age requirement save continuation by recognition, so that universal suffrage is the rule otherwise. It
is this background of Anglo-Saxon, Norman and Elizabethan views of
the electoral age requirement that the emigrants to the New World took
with them, applied until the Revolution of 1776, and continued into
the Constitution of 1787. We turn to the American colonies and their
use of 21 as the minimum voting age.
THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND
The English use of particular and even peculiar terms is continued
by the colonists who, after all, deemed themselves transplanted Englishmen. Insofar as voting age is concerned, the same general connotations
given to "freeman" and "freeholder" are found transported across the
ocean so that, for example, Samuel Eliot Morison equates the former
with "voters," 4 i.e., they have attained their majority. As we shall see,
the early documents and charters of the sixteenth and following centuries, while generally vague as to age, in effect follow the language
used in the English statutes and common law until the period of the
Revolution is reached. Then, probably for the first time, the specific
age of 21, for purposes of voting, comes to the fore. Until then, however, the tenor and implication of the charters and records discloses
that freemen, freeholders, officials, and others occupying appointed or
elected positions of authority or influence were adults, i.e., 21, and that
voters partook of this qualification through reference to e.g., freemen,
as being those able to vote, and freeholders (who, by English definition,
usually had to be 21), as being those able to be elected.
THE EARLY CHARTERS

There seems to be little of historical detail concerning age, that
is, of "full" or "voting" age, in the available records of the early settlers of the 1580's and 90's. We do know that the first settlers were
"men of the rough-and-ready, adventurous type," and that later these
84 See note 92, in/ra, where he so does, at least for the Mayflower Compact.
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were followed by "men, women, and children, seemingly of the more
domestic, peace-loving sort.""8 It was these latter who created permanent settlements but who, nevertheless, continued to be governed from
England, e.g., as in the case of Lord Baltimore, who ruled Maryland
from afar "as absolute lord and proprietor.""6 Nevertheless, each
colony utilized the English common law, as later modified because of
experience, 7 and followed the mother country in its own land and
descent laws, 8 its ecclesiastical organizations, and in the procedure and
practice of its assemblies.8 9
The first three Charters of Virginia, beginning with 1606, provided for councils and assemblies, but these were in effect appointed
by or subservient to the royal will,9" as was that later created in the
1620 Patent of the Council for New England.9 l In none of these councils, assemblies, or other bodies were qualifications set forth explicitly,
but insofar as age was concerned it can be seen from the lists of named
appointees, or the general descriptions of the offices, that all who sat
85 C. Andrews, Our Earliest Colonial Settlements 16 (1933, repr. 1959) (hereafter
Andrews, Our Earliest), and see 41-2, discussing Virginia. Prof. Andrews' little volume
studies the settlements begun in Virginia, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and
Maryland, but nowhere discusses voting age. However, there does come through the
"adult" qualification.
86 Id. at 151, and see 68. The proprietorship did not end, technically, until the last
Lord Baltimore, in 1770, bequeathed his entire estates to two illegitimate children who, in
turn, were later dispossessed in 1781 by the new powers, the State later paying the sum of
$50,000 as recompense. At 164. Besides chartered companies and proprietary patents there
were also Crown colonies (see note 94, infra). On the "absoluteness" of Lord Baltimore's
powers see the 1632 Charter of Maryland which, in par. VII, grants him "free, full, and
absolute power . . . to Ordain, Make, and Enact LAWS ... of and with the Advice, Assent,
and Approbation of the Free-Men of the same Province . . . ." This preliminary and superficial veto power is, however, constricted and removed shortly by other language. W. MacDonald, Select Charters 56 (1899) (hereafter MacDonald, Select) ; see also note 98, infra.
87 See, e.g., the 1774 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress,
Resolve 6, "That they [the inhabitants] are entitled to the benefit of such of the English
statutes, as existed at the time of their colonization; and which they have, by experience,
respectively found to be applicable to their several local and other circumstances." MacDonald, Select, at 359; see also Forkosch, The Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy and Its
Modern Application to Labor, 40 Texas L. Rev. 304, 473 (1962) (hereafter Forkosch, Doctrine).
88 See, esp., the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina of 1669, MacDonald, Select, at
149-54, which refers, inter alia, to landgraves, cassiques, leet-men and women, and other
purely English terms.
89 See, e.g., Forkosch, Doctrine, and Andrews, Our Earliest, at 27, and also 142-3; as
to Maryland see 153-4.
90 Andrews, Our Earliest, at 5-6, 13-14, 18-19, the Charters being at 1606, 1609, and
1611-12.
91 Id. at 26, where the King named forty of his cousins and others as "the first .
Councill" with these individuals having the right to fill vacancies, i.e., self-perpetuating.
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were adults.92 The first somewhat truly representative legislature in
America was constituted in Virginia in 1619. It consisted of twentytwo burgesses, elected by eleven towns, plantations, and (taken from
England) hundreds, who sat with the council and so formed the assembly.93 Unfortunately, these legislative assemblies accomplished little
until the collapse of the Virginia Company in 1624 created a Crown
colony, the first in America, whereupon the planters petitioned the King
to allow, inter alia, their local council to continue as a restraint upon
the Crown's governor; thus self-government began its birth-pangs in
these decades, even though it "was hardly democratic .. ."
It was not until 1638"5 that the three Connecticut settlements at
Windsor, Wethersfield, and Hartford assumed the control of their own
affairs and that "the first written constitution known to history that
created a government" was drafted; however, it was barren of any age
requirements, for its two legislative bodies and officials were chosen
"by all that are admitted freemen and have taken the Oath of Fidellity ... ."" While the 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties does spe92 Id. at 35, where the 1621 Ordinance for Virginia gives the names of those in the
Council of State, and at 35-6 gives the composition of the General Assembly; see also note 93,
infra. The first Charter of Massachusetts of March 4/14, 1628/9, also provided for assemblies (at 40-41), but age does not enter. Samuel Eliot Morison's comments on the
Mayflower Compact of 1620 include these: "The forty-one signers . . . included every head
of a family, every adult bachelor . . . and most of the hired menservants. The only males
who did not sign were those under age, and two sailors .. . ." "The twenty signers who
survived the first six months ashore acted as 'freemen" (voters) . . . [and] admitted to
the franchise, individually and sparingly, boys as they grew up" etc. D. Boorstin, ed., An
American Primer I, 2, 4 (1966).
93 G. Fisher, The Colonial Era 42-43 (1901)
(hereafter Fisher, Colonial) ; see also
preliminary note in MacDonald, Select, at 34. Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of
Virginia, written in 1781-82, referred to "small districts of five or six miles square, called
hundreds .. ." The Staff, Social Sciences 1, The People Shall Judge I, 220 (1949) (hereafter People).
94 Andrews, Our Earliest, supra note 85, at 58. On the contents of the petition see 54.
See also 119, esp. 131-3, on Connecticut.
95 The 1629 Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions to Patroons (given by the Netherlands), in par. III permitted a colonizer to so term himself upon planting at least "fifty souls,
upwards of fifteen years old," in the New Netherlands. H. Commager, ed., Documents of
American History 19 (3d ed. 1947) (hereafter Commager, Documents).
96 Although in par. 7 there seemingly is a change to "all that are admitted inhabitants
. . . provided that non [sic] be chosen a Deputy . . .which is not a Freeman . . . ." MacDonald, Select, respectively at 60, note 61, and 63. On the "freeman" aspect also see the
Fundamental Articles of New Haven of 1639 which opened by referring to "all the free
planters [who had now] assembled . . . ." At 67. The 1643 united effort of New Haven,
Guilford, and Milford in forming a representative government permitted only "free burgesses"
to "have power . . . to chuse fitt and able men" as judges, or to "vote in the election of
all" other officials. At 101, et seq. The 1662 Royal Charter of Connecticut set up a Governor,
Deputy Governor, plus twelve Assistants, "to bee from tyme to tyme Constituted, Elected and
Chosen out of the Freemen of the said Company." At 117-18.
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cifically mention age, i.e., 21, twice, the first time with respect to the
ability to make wills and alienate property, and the second time "for
giveing of votes, verdicts or Sentence in any Civil1 Courts or causes,'"9"
it otherwise refers merely to "freemen," e.g., they have power "to make
such [customs or prescriptions] by laws and constitutions," "to choose
yearly . . . all the Generall officers," "to choose such deputies for the
Generall Court," etc.9" The first 1662 charter of South Carolina also
refers to "Freemen" (and also "freeholders"), as does that of 1663 for
Rhode Island and Providence, as well as the 1664 New Jersey concession and agreement (referring also to freeholders), whereas the 1669
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina mentions "freemen" passingly
10 0
99
but throughout refers to "freeholders" who choose those for office,
and eventually speaks of seventeen as a dividing line for proscribing
those above it from "any benefit or protection of the law" who are not
church members or of some profession of God, and requiring all between 17 and 60 to bear arms.'0 '
Since effective English legislative supremacy does not occur until
1689, it is understandable that the colonial assemblies were at first
innocuous, so that general or universal suffrage was not of much consequence and could be and was highly restricted.' 2 Thus colonial elec97 MacDonald, Select, at 75 and 81 (see also the 1691 Second Charter, at 205, and the
Explanatory Charter of 1725, at 233), although in the Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina, supra note 88, at 154, "the younger sons of proprietors" may become members of
a court (quaere: does "younger" require or permit minors). See also R. Taylor, Massachusetts, Colony to Commonwealth (1961) (hereafter Taylor, Massachusetts), stating of the
1691 Charter that "According to law every town with forty or more freeholders had to send a
representative to the General Court [i.e., the legislature]," but since each town was required
to pay for travel and maintenance, many refrained from so doing because of the expense (at
4-5).
98 MacDonald, Select, at 82-3. See also the 1680 Charter of Pennsylvania, at 186 and
187, where William Penn is given power to make laws "by and with the advice, assent and
approbacon of the freemen" although in emergencies their consent is not required (see
also note 86, supra). See the 1682 Frame of Government of Pennsylvania at 192 et seq., mentioning "freemen" continually and as voting for the Provincial Council (par. Second, at
193), but nowhere defining the term (see also the 1683, 1696, and 1701 documents at 200,
217, and 224).
99 There is no definition of this term but par. CXVII, at 168, states that "Nor shall
any person ... above seventeen years old, have any estate or possession in Carolina, or protection or benefit of the law there, who hath not, before a precinct register, subscribed these
Fundamental Constitutions in this form," thereupon setting forth an oath of allegiance.
100 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, respectively at 122, 123, 129, 142, 143,
145, and 165 and 159 et seq. (esp. pars. LXXI-1I, and cl. XCII).
101 Id. at 166 and 168 (at 153 the age of 21 is mentioned in referring to the alienation of
lands). See also the 1676 Concessions of West New Jersey, at 175 et seq., esp. at 181, Chap.
XXXV, that "the said Proprietors and freeholders at their choice of persons to serve them in
the General and Free Assembly of the Province .... "
102 See Forkosch, Who Are the "People" in the Preamble to the Constitution?, 19 Case
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tors generally had to be landowners or taxpayers, even though the
governments were to be "democratical,"' 3 and in Connecticut, for example, where "the source of civil and religious authority . . . [was]
such of the people as were deemed worthy to exercise it,"' 4 an oath of
religious fidelity was also required.0 5
The lengthy upheaval in England gave rise to the Long Parliament
and, finally, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 which settled the question
of supremacy between the King and the Parliament. A spin-off appeared and continued to be the insistence of the home government in
London upon popularly elected assemblies in the provinces whenever
and wherever possible.'0 6 The subsequent efforts of George III and his
ministers to centralize and also to control colonial affairs'0 7 must be
cast against this portion of the total scene, for by the time of the 1776
rebellion all of the colonies had some form of a representative assembly. This is indicated by the 1774 Declaration and Resolves of the First
Continental Congress which referred to the grievances of "the people
of America" who now, "justly alarmed at these arbitrary proceedings
of parliament and administration, have severally elected, constituted,
and appointed deputies to meet . . ." and these deputies now declared
"That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government,
108
is a right in the people to participate in their legislative council. . ....
West. Res. L. Rev. 644, 661-2 (1968) (hereafter Forkosch, People). See also the Charter,
supra note 95, and from the tenor of the other paragraphs the Patroons who ruled were all
adults. See also MacDonald, Select, at 44.
103 Andrews, Our Earliest, supra note 85, at 1014.
104 Andrews, Our Earliest, at 139.
105 See, e.g., A Hart, Formation of the Union 14 (1893) (hereafter Hart, Formation),
who also writes that "the number of voters at that time [17501 was not more than a fifth to
an eighth as large in proportion to the population as at present." As of 1970 it would be
even smaller. See also Andrews, Our Earliest, at 121, that "It is an interesting and suggestive fact that Connecticut and Rhode Island were the last of the original thirteen colonies
to throw off a money or property qualification upon the right to vote .. .."
106 See, e.g., J. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 30-1 (1943), excepting from
this home policy "the brief interlude of the Dominion of New England (1686-1689) in
which the assemblies were abolished and rule by an appointed government and council
initiated . .. ." See also Fisher, Colonial, supra note 93, Chap. XII on "The Effects on the
Colonies of the Revolution of 1688."
107 See, e.g., the English 1774 Massachusetts Government Act which sought "for the
better regulating [of] the government of the province" and which therefore rejected the
annual elections of counsellors or assistants and henceforth had them appointed by the
Crown, although qualifications for service on juries included a minimum of 21 years of age
(maximum 70). MacDonald, Select, respectively at 343, 345, 348.
108 MacDonald, Select, respectively at 357, 358, and 359, and on the two Continental
Congresses see the next few paragraphs. "The people," of course, was a highly restricted
group, supra note 102.
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THE REVOLUTIONARY

SITUATION

During the pre-Revolution period there is little of aid to our inquiry; all is either darkness or cloudy. For example, the Stamp Act of
1765 spawned a host of colonial resolutions in opposition, with that of
Virginia being the first. It contained the statement "That the Taxation
of the People themselves, or by Persons chosen by themselves to represent them," was the only permissible method, i.e., it was the people who
chose their representatives, but no further description or qualification
of these electors was given.1 °9 Pennsylvania (and, with slight language
variations, Connecticut, South Carolina, and New Jersey) claimed "That
the only legal Representatives of the Inhabitants of this Province are
the Persons they annually elect... ," although the Maryland language
referred to "the Representatives of the Freemen of this Province ...";
Massachusetts stated negatively only "That the Inhabitants of this Province are not, and never have been represented in the Parliament ....19110
The Stamp Act Congress that fall, to which "delegates" from nine of
the colonies traveled, in its Declaration aped the Pennsylvania language
and contended "That the only Representatives of the People of these
Colonies, are Persons chosen thereby by themselves .

.

. ,,1

In other

words, general references to the "People," or "Persons," or "Inhabitants," were insufficient to particularize their age, although, as already
seen, "freeman" was undoubtedly specific.
By the following decade the differences between the mother country and the colonies came to a head. Thus on September 5, 1774, on the
eve of the Revolution, delegates from all the colonies save Georgia
gathered at Philadelphia as the First Continental Congress.112 They
adopted a Declaration of Colonial Rights which, inter alia, stated that
"The good people of the several colonies . . . have severally elected,
109 E. Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act
Crisis, 1764-1766 (1959) (hereafter Morgan, Prologue), at 48 and 50, with the quotations
respectively at: 51 (55, 57, 60) ; 53. New York's Resolve was unique, merely referring to
the claim that historically applications, etc. "have always been made to the Representatives of the People of this Colony . . . ." At 61.
110 Id. at 57. The Instructions of the Town of Braintree (to Ebenezer Thayer), drafted
by John Adams, referred to the "grand and fundamental principle of the constitution, that
no freeman should be subject to any tax to which he has not given his own consent, in
person or by proxy." Commager, Documents, supra note 95, at 57.
111 Morgan, Prologue, supra note 109, at 63; see also MacDonald, Select, at 314.
112 Hart, Formation, supra note 105, at 61, writes that this "First Continental Congress
... was, therefore, a body without any legal status."
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constituted, and appointed deputies" who were now assembled, but nowhere mentioned the qualifications of these "good people.""' They also
recommended that each colony "establish a modified charter government as a temporary expedient pending reconciliation with Great Britain,""' 4 which recommendation was not only repeated by the Second
Continental Congress in November of the following year, but on May
10, 1776 was supplemented by advice to the colonies to form permanent governments."' The Second Continental Congress also adopted
their own Declaration "setting forth the causes and necessity of their
taking up arms" which, inter alia, charged that "Not a single man" of
the English Parliament, which assumed the right to make laws binding
the colonists "in all cases whatsoever ... is chosen by us or is subject
to our control or influence .... ,16 In all this nothing expressly appears with respect to the voting age of those who chose or even served.
Who, therefore, chose representatives up to this time, and who,
thereafter, were so to choose? To 1776, as we have seen, the choosers
(electors) were not clearly limited to those 21 or over. But there now
occurs a series of events which bears importantly on this subject. As already noted, the two Continental Congresses had advised the colonies to
form new governments, and on July 4, 1776 the Second Congress's
Declaration of Independence proclaimed that it emanated from "the
Thirteen United States of America," not colonies." 7 The thirteen colonies therefore rushed their transformation into states, and it is their
constitutional activities during this period which must now be examined.
THE FIRST STATE

CONSTITUTIONS

The first constitution to be adopted was that of New Hampshire,
promulgated on January 5, 1776, and the last was that of Massachusetts
in 1780. By 1777 there were ten in effect, but of the eventual thirteen
only that of Massachusetts, drafted by a convention called for that sole
113 People, supra note 93, I, 158.
114 Taylor, Massachusetts, supra note 97, at 13.
115 Hart, Formation, supra note 105, at 81.
116 People, supra note 93, I, 161, 162, "in all cases whatsoever" being capitalized.
This Declaration of July 6, 1775 was followed a year later by the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 (at 201). Prof. Hart states that this Second Continental Congress
now "constituted a government exercising great sovereign powers. It began with no such
authority; it never received such authority until 1781." Hart, Formation at 76.
117 The Second Congress's Declaration opened by stating that it was "A declaration by
the representatives of the United Colonies of North America . . . ." People, I, 161.
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purpose, was thereafter submitted for ratification by popular vote, the
first such procedure in the United States. The backgrounds of the New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Virginia provisions are of some interest. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1776 was expressly a stopgap one, 1 ' and consisted of but a few paragraphs and resolutions which
did not mention elections, electors, or ages."' However, the eventuallyratified full-length Constitution of 1784 did specify age. It provided
that senators "be annually elected by freeholders and other inhabitants
of this state, qualified as in this constitution is provided," and one of
the qualifications shortly enumerated was, "of twenty-one years of age
and upwards ... .120
Massachusetts had a background of age ambiguity, e.g., the Resolves of the Stockbridge Convention of December 15, 1776 contained
a recommendation "to the Freeholders, and other inhabitants qualified,"
to vote for various officers. 2 ' Now, however, on October 22, 1776, "the
Inhabitents of the Town of Concord being free & twenty one years of
age and upward," met and resolved that a constitutional convention be
called to frame a charter of government. 2 2 The other town petitions and
resolves are not specific as to the age of those joining in the call or being eligible to vote; nevertheless, a constitution was eventually framed.
This document of 1778 was rejected because of the lack of a Bill of
Rights, but its article V spoke unequivocally as to age: "Every male
inhabitant of any town in this State, being free, and twenty-one years of
age,... shall be intitled to vote .... ,,12' Even the objectors to the proposed Constitution did not cavil at 21,124 and one town expressly upheld
118 It stated, inter alia, that "We, the members of the Congress of New Hampshire,
chosen and appointed by the free suffrages of the people of said colony, . . . conceive ourselves reduced to the necessity of establish A FORM OF GOVERNMENT to continue during
the present unhappy and unnatural contest with Great Britain . . . ." F. Thorpe, ed., The
Federal and State Constitutions IV, 2451, 2452 (7 vols. 1909) (hereafter Thorpe, Federal).
119 However, the Congress turned itself into an assembly which was "then [to] proceed
to choose twelve persons, being reputable freeholders and inhabitants" to act as a Council.
Id. at 2452.
120 Id. at 2459. "All persons qualified to vote in the election of senators shall be
intitled to vote ... [for] representatives." At 2461.
121 Taylor, Massachusetts, supra note 97, at 16, where the Constitutionalists' objections
give this language. See also the Town of Pittsfield's Petition that same month to the
General Assembly that "the good people of this province" vote (at 19), again so generalizing,
as did the General Court's (Assembly's) Proclamation of January 23, 1776, referring to
"the good people of this Colony [who] have chosen representatives (at 21).
122 Commager, Documents, supra note 95, at 105. This convention was the first such
suggestion in Massachusetts by any locality, but not utilized until 1779.
123 Taylor, Massachusetts, at 53.
124 Id. at 59, 62, 64-5, 69, 70.
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it."' The eventual and ratified constitution of 1780 also required that
"every male inhabitant... [be] twenty-one years of age and upwards"
126
before being eligible to vote.
The 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights at first stated generally
that "all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest
1 27
with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of suffrage,''
but later again generalized by having this right "remain as exercised at
present,' 128 thus giving no express age or other qualification. Even
Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia, written in 1781-82,
mentioned only that legislators were "chosen annually by the citizens"
possessing some portion of land. 12 However, the colonial statutory
background which required that an elector be "a freeman having 500
acres," etc., i.e., also a freeholder, indicates conclusively that these
terms and references mandate a qualification of 21 as to age.' 0 That
this is not an erroneous conclusion is shown by the Virginia Constitution
of 1864 which set forth, as one of the voter qualifications, "the age of
twenty-one years."''
As with these constitutions and statutes of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Virginia, so was 21 found in the 1776 Constitutions of
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania,
as well as those later ones of Georgia (1777), South Carolina (1778),
and Delaware (1792),"a2 while Connecticut's (1715) and Rhode Is125

Id. at 65.

Id. at 133, giving Chap. I, See. II, Art. II, including other qualifications on voters for
senators, while Sec. III, Art. IV, dealing with representatives, omits "and upwards;" see
also that Address to the Convention which referred to the two legislative bodies which "are
to be chosen by the Male Inhabitants who are Twenty one Years of age . . ." (at 125).
See also Thorpe, Federal, supra note 118, III, 1895, 1898, for this language.
127 Thorpe, Federal, VII, 3813.
128 Id. at 3816. Its Ordinance of 1621, granted by James I, permitted part of its popular
Council "to be respectively chosen by the Inhabitants .. . ." At 3811. Its subsequent Constitutions of 1830 and 1850 do not refer to age (see, however, note 130, infra).
129 People, supra note 93, at 214.
130 Prof. Thorpe's table of statutory qualifications discloses that Virginia's "Law of
1762-69" required that an elector be "a freeman having 500 acres," etc. Thorpe, Constitutional, supra note 33 at 96.
131 Thorpe, Federal, supra note 118, VII, 3854, also repeated in its Constitutions of
1870 (at 3875) and 1902 (at 3906).
132 See Thorpe, Constitutional, supra note 33, giving a table of the "Qualifications of
Electors Prescribed by the Constitutions 1776-1800" at I, 93-95. The Delaware and South
Carolina earlier constitutions of 1776 had respectively stated that the voters' qualifications
were to be those "as exercised by law" and "as required by law." Thorpe, Federal, supra note
118, respectively at I, 563, and VI, 3245. The 1701 Charter of Delaware granted by William
Penn "unto all the Freemen, Planters and Adventurers therein," stated that "For the well
governing of this Province and Territories, there shall be an Assembly yearly chosen, by
the Freemen thereof ... ." Id. 1, 557, 559.
126
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land's (1762) earlier laws, specifying 21, were thereafter repeated in
their constitutions ;188 Vermont, while vacillating between possession and
statehood, did have two constitutions which specified 21 ;14 and those of
Kentucky (1792) and Tennessee (1796) did likewise. By the turn of
the nineteenth century, therefore, whether by constitution, statute, or
custom, every state in the Union, original or admitted, required 21 as
the minimum age for voting; but, of importance for the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 which promulgated the federal Constitution under
which we live, by that year every one of the thirteen Colonies-turnedStates so required.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787
From Revolution to ratification the United States was a confederacy, with the Articles of Confederation specifying throughout that it
was the states which sent delegates and which wielded the power. Nevertheless, the Congress under these Articles did formulate a bit of federal
policy which bears upon voting age. This legislation was known to the
Founding Fathers, for a good many of them were in or had close connections with that interim national government. When the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 was adopted on July 13th of that year, the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention had been laboring since May 25th' and
would continue until September 17th. Additionally, that Ordinance had
been preceded by Congressional action in 1783 when it appointed a committee to report on the lands ceded by the states to the federal government; Thomas Jefferson, as chairman, had, on March 1, 1784, submitted
a plan for the government of the western territory which was adopted
three weeks later. Jefferson's Ordinance was not satisfactory (even
133 Prof. Thorpe's table of constitutional qualifications (Thorpe, Constitutional, supra
note 33) is followed at 96, by one entitled "The Qualifications of Electors as Prescribed by
Law," and includes, besides the references to Connecticut and Rhode Island, others to New
Jersey's of 1797 and Pennsylvania's of 1799, although the last two statutes are preceded by
their Constitutions of 1776. The Connecticut (1818) and Rhode Island (1842) Constitutions,
respectively given in Thorpe, Federal, supra note 118, I, 544, and VI, 3224, disclose 21 as the
specified voting age.
134 When New York finally withdrew its objections, Vermont was formally admitted
into the Union in 1790, but its two Constitutions of 1777 and 1786 referred to 21, as did its
Constitution of 1793. Thorpe, Federal, supra note 118, VI, 3742, 3755 (3757), 3765 (3768).
135 The first day on which deputies gathered at Philadelphia was May 14th, but as a
majority of the states were not represented, those present adjourned daily till the 25th, when
such a majority was found. M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (4
vols. 1937), at I, 3 (hereafter Farrand, Records). As is known, there are several versions of
the Convention's proceedings, from the official Journal to those of the delegates attending,
kept privately (see Farrand's Introduction, I, xi-xxv, for discussions and analyses). That
referred to is Madison's Notes, save where otherwise stated.
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he was bitterly disappointed in that his anti-slavery clause had been
stricken), and three different ordinances were thereafter reported to
Congress before it finally adopted the famous one of 1787. Among its
provisions was one that eventually permitted five thousand free male
inhabitants of the district, "of full age," to elect their own representatives."5 6
With the English and colonial background as sources from which
to draw, and with their own experiences fresh in their minds, the delegates to the Convention had laid before them, four days after they
opened officially, two plans of government, one by Edmund Randolph
of Virginia, and the other by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. The
Virginia Plan's first Resolution urged "that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged as to" create a new form of
government, and the fourth... Resolution opened by having the lower
branch of the national legislature "elected by the people of the several
States . . . ." The Pinckney proposal was that it "be chosen ... by the
people of the several States & the qualifications of the electors shall be
the same as those of the Electors in the several States for their legislatures .... .188
During the next two days the first inklings of the fundamental 8
136 The preceding is found in M. Farrand, The Legislation of Congress For the
Government of the Organized Territories of the United States, 1789-1895, 6-10 (1896).
The ratification of the Constitution occurred in 1789, and among the first acts of the
new Congress was one to permit the territory south of the Ohio River, ceded by North
Carolina, to organize in a fashion and on conditions similar to that of the Northwest
Territory. So, too, in 1798, was organized the territory ceded by South Carolina and
Georgia. At 19-20. Other similar federal legislation was therafter enacted from time to time as
required, e.g., the Indiana territory was organized in 1800 on the same representative basis
as that in the 1787 act, i.e., "free males of age" (at 57, from App. B's listing of the
statutes), and the government of Michigan was changed in 1823 with representatives
again to be chosen by "free white males of age" (at 65) ; and Congress did even refer
specifically to 21 as the voting age in its 1893 statute with respect to the Oklahoma territory
(at 92).
137 This fourth Resolution later was reported out by the Committee of the Whole as its
third recommendation (Farrand, Records, supra note 135, at 235, and see note 145, infra),
and is so discussed below (note 158, infra).
138 Farrand, Records, supra note 135, respectively at I, 20, and 111, 596 (see explanation as to authenticity of details in latter document at 595, 601 et seq., with Farrand's reconstruction giving Pinckney's proposal this language: "The House of Delegates [i.e., Repre." At 605).
The Pinckney proposals
sentatives] to be elected by the State Legislatures ...
do not loom importantly hereafter in the debates.
139 The greatest difference was the small-versus-large state voting, and the Great Compromise is found in having the members of the lower house elected on the basis of numbers
of population, while the upper house is based on equality of numerical representation. During
the debates references to the qualifications on suffrage appear, e.g., Farrand, Records, supra
note 135, I, 465 et seq., but while property, etc. are mentioned, age is absent (understood?).
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differences in the Convention appeared;14° on May 31st the abovequoted fourth Virginia Resolution was brought before the delegates
sitting as a Committee of the Whole. Extended debate now occurred, the
opponents feeling that the state legislatures, and not the people directly,
should elect the lower Representatives. The vote finally taken was in
favor of the people, although close, viz., six states supporting the clause,
two opposed, and two divided, whereupon the remainder of the Resolution was postponed "as entering too much into detail for general propositions."'' This division resulted in a 6-5 vote the following week for
reconsideration,' 42 with Pinckney now reversing himself and moving
"that the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State
Legislatures, and not by the people ... .," After extended and somewhat sharp debate the motion was defeated by a vote of 8-3,"' and the
subsequent report and recommendation of the Committee to the Convention (merely changing the paragraph number from "4." to "3.")
was "that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature
ought to be elected by the people of the several States .. .
140 The first Virginia Resolution became the subject of delicate maneuvering on May
30th, in the Committee of the Whole, the statists fighting the nationalists (see Id., I, 33-35) ;
the latter finally won, by a vote of 6-1, with an eighth state (New York) being divided, and
the language agreed upon was "that a national Governt. ought to be established . . ." (at
35). However, New Jersey was not yet present through its delegates, so that its own later
Plan could be voted upon by eleven, not eight, states. See notes 149 et seq., infra, on this
new plan, and also the Virginia-New Jersey split differences. See notes 145 and 156, infra,
on the final showdown between the statists and the nationalists.
141 Farrand, Records, supra note 135, I, 47-51, the vote being at 50, and the quotation
being at 51. The Virginia Plan's remaining language in the fourth Resolution went into
explicit details concerning the qualifications of the representatives themselves, but nothing
was said concerning the qualifications of the "people," i.e., the voters.
142 Id. at 124, by a vote of 6-5 on the motion of Pinckney and John Rutledge, also of
South Carolina. The South Carolina delegation also included Pierce Butler and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. The former expressed himself, during the earlier debate, against "election
by the people [as] an impractical mode" (I, 50), whereas the latter was generally (see,
however, note 143, infra) silent (see character sketch by William Pierce [of Georgia, who
attended beginning on May 31st and was absent after July 1st (III, 589)] concerning the
four South Carolina delegates, stating of this second Pinckney that "he is generally considered an indifferent Orator." III, 96. Pierce gives their ages as 24 for Charles, and about
40 for Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.
143 Id. at 132, with Rutledge seconding the motion Charles Cotesworth Pinckney spoke in
favor of the motion (at 137), making the South Carolina delegation unanimous in their
opposition to the Virginia proposal.
114 Id. at 137-8. Maryland's delegates appeared June 2d (I, 76: III, 33, and see note
146, infra), making eleven states now attending. The original vote of 6-2-2 had Connecticut
and Delaware divided; the former now voted in favor of the Pinckney motion, and the
latter against, with Maryland joining in opposition, so that the original 6 became 8, and the
original 2 became 3.
145 Id. at 235, the details and limitations (see note 141 supra) being omitted. On the
changed number see note 137, supra, and 158, inIra. See also 228 for the Journal's language.
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What next occurred must be placed in chronological and contextual perspective: the Virginia and Pinckney Plans had both been proposed on May 29th and referred to the Committee of the Whole for
consideration; on May 31st the Virginia proposal to have the lower
branch elected by the people was adopted by a vote of 6-2-2; on June
5th the Pinckney-Rutledge motion for reconsideration was passed, 6-5,
but on June 6th defeated 8-3; apparently "the people" had won. But
the victory was only in Committee, and another battle had to be fought.
The delegates, still sitting in Committee, continued their deliberations
to June 13th. On that day they rose and reconstituted themselves as a
Convention, with Nathaniel Gorham, of Massachusetts, who had chaired
the Committee, now reporting its recommendations. At this point Randolph, seconded by Luther Martin, of Maryland,' 4 6 moved "to postpone
the farther consideration of the report till tomorrow," which passed. 4 '
The reason was that during this period of Committee gestation and voting the "state" forces had been preparing their ammunition and gathering their cohorts.1 4 The following day, on June 14th, William Patterson,
of New Jersey, "observed to the Convention that it was the wish of several deputations.., that further time ought to be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the Committee . . . and to digest one
purely federal . . ." and he thereupon successfully moved for a postponement to June 15th.' 49 On that day Patterson presented to the Convention the New Jersey plan "which he said several of the deputations
wished to be submitted" for the Virginia one; this was referred to the
Committee of the Whole and it was also felt "that in order to place the
two plans in due comparison, the other [Virginia Plan] should [also]
be recommitted."' 5 0
The New Jersey Plan was an outright rejection of a new form
of government, and sought only to have the Articles of Confederation
"so revised, corrected & enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution
They also reported that "1. Resd. that it is the opinion of this Committee that a National
Governmt. ought to be established ... ." See, on this last, note 140, supra, and 156, infra.
146 He appeared as a delegate on June 9th, Id. at 175, although see references in note
144, supra.
147 Farrand, Records I, 223, the Journal, with Madison writing that the report "was
postponed till tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed ....
" At
234-5.
148 See, e.g., Madison's description of this background, Id. at I, 242.
149 Id. at 240, the quotation being Madison's, the motion being the Journal's. Randolph

seconded the motion and also moved for adjournment, seconded by Martin.
150 Id. at 242.
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adequate to the exigencies of Government, & the preservation of the
Union."'' There was therefore no problem of voter qualifications, for
the state legislatures would elect or appoint the delegates. But the issue
so joined had to be resolved before the question of voter qualification
could be determined. Beginning on June 16th the debates ranged
widely and furiously, and it was on June 18th that Alexander Hamilton,
of New York, who had thus far been silent in the deliberations of the
Convention, rose and made a lengthy and impassioned address, culminating in his own proposals or plan. He was, of course, in favor of
an independent national government, and he proposed that the lower
branch of the national legislature "consist of persons elected by the
people .... ,152 However, Hamilton's language in proposing his plan
was (as Madison reports it) that it was but a "paper he had sketched,"
and so he "read his sketch" to the delegates. 5 Professor Farrand goes
into some detail and, of concern to us is his reproduction of a document
"which was not submitted to the Convention and has no further value
than attaches to the personal opinions of Hamilton."' 54 Nevertheless,
this was, at the very least, the later opinion of Hamilton with respect
to the lower branch's qualifications:
The Assembly shall consist of persons to be called representatives,
who shall be chosen, except in the first instance, by the free male
citizens & inhabitants of the several States comprehended in the union,
all of whom of the age of twenty one years & upwards shall be entitled
to an equal vote. 155
The Hamilton speech and Plan were the last items of business that
June 18th, and the following day the basic conflict between those advocating a new form of national government (the Virginia Plan) and
those desiring merely to amend and continue the Articles (the New
151 Id. at 242, being the first of a series of resolutions. On June 18th John Dickinson, of
Delaware, moved to substitute a different first resolution (at 281) which was defeated the
following day (at 313), and the original New Jersey first proposition was then postponed
(at 322).
152 Id. at 291, his speech occupying pp. 282-293. One of Prof. Farrand's references
states the delivery took "between five and six hours, and was pronounced by a competent
judge, (Gouverneur Morris), the most able and impressive he had ever heard." At 293, n.9.
153 Farrand, Records I, 291. In 1818 James Madison wrote to John Quincy Adams that
Hamilton had never submitted a plan but had only "sketched an outline which he read as
part of a speech.
... III, 426.
154 Id. III, 619. He gives the document as: "Copy of a paper Communicated to J. M.
[James Madison] by Col. Hamilton, about the close of the Convention . . . which he said
delineated the Constitution which he would have wished to be proposed by the Convention . .. ."

155 Id. at 619-20.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Jersey Plan) came to the fore. It may have been Madison's rhetoric
which carried the day for his state's Plan, but there were others who
agreed; the final result was, for all practical purposes, an emphatic
rejection of every plan but the Virginia one.' 56 The delegates, in Convention, now undertook to examine, seriatim, each recommended Committee Resolution, 57 the third 58 one's first clause unsuccessfully being
made the subject of a crippling amendment (to have the lower national
branch appointed by the states legislatures), and then being adopted
verbatim as had been originally proposed by Virginia and then recommended by the Committee.'5 9 Apparently the delegates' energy had been
expended on the debate concerning the amendment, for on the first
clause of the third Resolution there appears only the putting of the
question and the vote, and none of the official or unofficial records discloses any statement concerning the qualifications of these "people."' 0
Nothing more on the subject appears in the Convention Records
until all the amended and adopted Resolutions were dumped into the
lap of the Committee of Detail on July 26th, and the Convention adjourned till August 6th to give that body "time to prepare & report the
Constitution. ' However, during this last day's discussion, George
Mason, of Virginia, seconded by Pinckney, moved to instruct the Committee "to receive a clause requiring certain qualifications of landed
property & citizenship . . . in members of the Legislature," whereupon Gouverneur Morris, of Pennsylvania, retorted that "If qualifications are proper, he wd. prefer them in the electors than the elected."' 2
Although speaking of the legislators, John Dickenson's (of Maryland)
words are pertinent; he "was agst. any recital of qualifications in the
156 Id. I, 322. for the vote, which was 7-3, with Maryland divided, and pp. 314-322 for
Madison's speech. The first Virginia Resolution (see notes 137, and 145, supra) for a
national government was then taken up, with an adjournment to the following day closing
the discussion (at 325). On June 20th, after a slight change in language was proposed by
Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut (at 335), and agreed to by Randolph (at 336), the
amendment was passed without objection (at 336), and the Committee passed on to the
second Virginia Resolution, apparently feeling that this national-state problem had been
resolved. This second Resolution, after discussion, was adopted by a vote of 7-3-1 on
June 21st (at 353).
157 For the first two see note 156, supra.
158 See notes 137 and 145, supra.
159 See, for the language, text keyed to notes 138 and 145, supra, the only difference
being that "People" was not capitalized. The amendment lost by 6-4-1, and the resolution
was adopted by 9-1-1, Maryland being the divided state in each instance. Farrand, Records I,
360.
160 See Id. at 353-368, which comprise the total Farrand records for June 21st.
161 Id. I1, 128.
162 Id.
, 121.
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Constitution. It was impossible to make a compleat one, and a partial
one would by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions. The best defence lay in the freeholders who were
to elect the Legislature."' 8 Regardless, the Committee undertook to
delve into the Convention's jumbled proceedings and to report out one
document. Professor Farrand has collated the "nearly complete series
of [nine] documents representing the various stages of the work of the
Committee,"' 4 and these bear significantly upon the question of voter
qualifications.
Before examining this series of documents a preliminary observation may be made on the Committee's work as here relevant: there will
appear a delicious ambivalence among the members of the Committee,
for there comes through either a disagreement which has to be, and yet
cannot be, resolved, or else a resignation to let the collective perpetrators of this dilemma make the decision. Nevertheless, a tentative conclusion will be in order, and the varieties of clauses and language
utilized will disclose the indecision of these members and the manner
in which they sought to resolve the problem.
The first three documents are unimportant for us, but the fourth
is in Randolph's handwriting and in its pertinent section is as follows:
11. The qualification of electors shall be the same (throughout
the states; viz.) with that in the particularstates, unless the legislature
shall hereafter direct some uniform qualification to prevail through
the states.
(citizenship:
manhood
sanity of mind
previous residence for one year, or possession of real property
within the state for the whole of one year, or inrolment in the
militia for the whole of a years.)165
The fifth document is in Wilson's handwriting and refers to the
biennial election of the lower house
163 Id. II, 123, abbreviation and punctuation so in Records. Does the reference to "freeholders" indicate a Convention knowledge that the electorate was a restricted and qualified
one? The answer is yes, on which see Forkosch, People, supra note 102.
164 Farrand, Records, supra note 135, II, 129.
165 Id. II, 139-40, and see also the corrected version of this document at TV, 40, where
n.8 is added to this language with this comment: "Marginal note crossed out: 'These qualifications are not justified by the resolutions.'" On Randolph's handwriting see 137, n.6, also
stating that parenthesized language is "crossed out in the original, italics represent changes
made in Randolph's handwriting . .
"
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by the People of the United States in the following Manner. Every
Freeman of the Age of twenty one Years (having a freehold Estate
within the United States) who has (having) resided in the United
States for the Space of one whole Year immediately preceding the Day
of Election, and has a Freehold Estate in at least fifty Acres of Land' 66

Undoubtedly the Committee got bogged down in not only these
details of qualification, as Dickinson had earlier warned concerning the
legislators, 6 ' but also in and with all of the other clauses, for the next
(sixth) document, also in Wilson's handwriting, presents a mishmash
of suggestions and conflicting language and clauses; it undoubtedly represents a combination of all the suggestions grouped into their appropriate places. For our purposes, two paragraphs are important. The
first states that the lower house is to be chosen
by the People of the several States comprehended within this Union (the
Time and Place and the Manner of holding the Elections and the
Rules) The Qualifications of the Electors shall be (appointed) prescribed by the Legislatures of the several States; but the ir provisions

(which they shall make concerning them shall be subject to the Control of) concerning them may at any Time be altered and super-

seded by the Legislature of the United States. 68

However, shortly thereafter, appears the following in one of two
parallel columns concerning the two houses of the national legislature:
The Times and Places and the Manner of holding the Elections

(for) of the Members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislatures of each State; but their Provisions concerning them may, at any
Time, 16be9 altered and superseded by the Legislature of the United
States.
It may appear that somewhat of a confusion is indicated by this
section paragraph, for it speaks of the Senate, as well as the House of
Representatives (i.e., "each House"), and permits the procedure for
"the Elections" of Senators to be set by the legislatures, subject to the
overriding authority of the Congress, whereas to now the several plans
have had the Senators chosen by the state legislatures. 7 ° In effect this
was the objection eventually urged by Madison and Gouverneur Morris,
whose motion to have the reference apply only to the House of Repre166

Id. II, 151, parenthetical language crossed out in original.

See note 163, supra.
Farrand, Records, supra note 135, II, 153, parenthetical language crossed out, and
italicized language later inserted in original.
169 Id. II, 155; see note 168, supra as to the parenthesized and italicized language.
Senate of the United States shall be
170 This sixth document also stated that "The ...
chosen.., by the Legislatures of the several States .... ." Id. II 154.
167
168
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sentatives was defeated.' However, the numerous suggestions and resolutions had produced a variety of versions which, now incorporated
by the Committee on Detail, did not do violence to the Convention's
swaying mood. It may also be queried whether this Committee had the
authority to make substantive policy determinations or recommendations, as will shortly be noted, but apparently this did not bother its
members or the Convention delegates. It may also be remarked that the
first paragraph deals with what we have originally termed the substantive portion of the present Constitution's art. I, § 2, cl. 1, and the second
paragraph deals with the procedural details found in art. I, § 4, cl. 1;
further, that while the first paragraph will ultimately be greatly changed
in practically every aspect of policy and language, the policy of the
second paragraph will be adopted in full and only the language will be
changed to reflect style. While the implication of this comment is that
the final policy determination of the Convention will be to reject any
Congressional control over the substantive qualifications of the electors,
this, as a conclusion, may wait until that body's entire proceedings have
been examined.
For the present, the final (ninth) document of the Committee of
Detail, also in Wilson's handwriting, represents the version which will
be reported to the Convention, albeit to be divided and subdivided into
articles and sections, and to be slightly changed in several details. It
makes a drastic revision of the first substantive paragraph quoted above
from the sixth document, and reflects a Committee determination which
the Convention will later accept, although the second quoted paragraph
is only slightly changed for style. The language now appears as follows:
The Qualifications of the Electors shall be (prescribed by the Legislatures of the several States; but these Provisions concerning them may,
at any Time be altered and superseded by the Legislature of the United
States) the same from Time to Time as those of the Electors, in the
several States, of the most numerous Branch of their own Legislatures.
The Times and Places and the Manner of holding the Elections
of the Members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature
of each State; but their Provisions concerning them may, at any
Time, 172
be altered (or superseded) by the Legislature of the United
States.
171
172

Id. II, 239-40.
Id. II, 1634, and 165, parenthetical language crossed out, italicized language added,

in original. This ninth document also has Senators chosen by the legislatures, II, 165; see also
note 170, supra.
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On the reporting date of August 6th the Committee presented its
lengthy and overly-detailed constitution. The two above-quoted paragraphs of the ninth document were repeated verbatim.' The following
day Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out the second sentence of the
first section of the proposed article IV pertaining to the election of
representatives, which is the first above-quoted paragraph in its amended
form, and it was this motion which sparked the only Convention debate
on the subject of the qualifications of the electors. Morris desired to
substitute some other provision so as to "restrain the right of suffrage to
freeholders,"' 7 4 fearing that the egalitarian mood of the country would
result in giving the votes to the propertyless who would "sell them to the
rich" and thereby create an "aristocracy [which] will grow out of the
House of Representatives."' 7 Wilson argued that "It was difficult to
form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States,"' 6 and Ellsworth urged that the "right of suffrage was a tender point, and most
strongly guarded by most of the [State] Constitutions."'71 Mason said
that eight or nine states had "extended the suffrage beyond the freeholders" and any national power to disfranchise was a "dangerous"
one, 178 also urging that ancient prejudices not be followed, i.e., since a
freehold qualification was found in England "it is imagined to be the
only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man having
evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society
ought to share in all its rights & privileges.' 1 79 Madison corrected Mason
173 Farrand, Records, supra note 135, I, 178, 179, changed, of course, as per the indi.
cated deletions and additions, supra note 172, but with fewer capitals, and one "the"
deleted (in second paragraph, before (now) "manner."
174 Id., II, 201.
175 Id. II, 202. John F. Mercer, of Maryland, supported the proposed restriction because "The people can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates .... The people in
Towns can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by that means always prevail over
the people of the Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of
candidates." At 205. Quaere: did this presage the twentieth century population movement,
and the eventual reapportionment cases?
176 Id. II, 201, also urging that having different federal and state qualifications might
exclude voters for state officials from voting for federal ones, to which Morris replied that
that occurred where some states had different qualifications for electors for Governor and
state representatives, and that "as it [the clause] stands ... it makes the qualifications of the
Natl. Legislature depend on the will of the States, which he thought not proper."
177 Id. II, 101. He also queried how the freehold was to be defined (at 202), and
Morris responded that he "did not conceive the difficulty .. . to be insuperable" (at 203).
178 Id. II, 201-02. Butler echoed these fears, but Dickinson "had a different idea," i.e.,
the freeholders were "the best guardians of liberty," were a "defence agst. the dangerous
influence of those multitudes without property and without principle," and since "The great
mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, . . [they] will be pleased with
it" (at 202). For Madison's views on liberty see note 181, infra.
179 Farrand, Records, supra note 135, I, 203.
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as to the English voting system,'8' and felt that "the freeholders . . .
would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty,"'' also pointing
up the possibility of an eventual class struggle between the propertied
and the propertyless.. 2 and thereby presaging his future and justlyfamous No. 10 in The Federalist.At this moment the great conciliator,
Benjamin Franklin, rose. He extolled the "virtue & public spirit of our
common people," pointed to their sufferings and patriotism during the
Revolution, and "was persuaded also that such a [freehold] restriction ... would give great uneasiness in the populous States.' 88
The result of this debate (solely on the worth of a freehold qualification) was a vote of 7-1 against the proposal,8 4 and the Convention
then adjourned. The next day, August 8th, there was practically no discussion when the entire first section of article IV was again brought up,
and it was now adopted without opposition.8 5 That day and the following one the other sections and clauses were discussed and voted upon,
until the first section of article VI (the second above-quoted paragraph
reported out by the Committee of Detail) was reached. That paragraph
is divided in two by a semi-colon (also found in the ratified document),
and the first procedural part was agreed to without much opposition.8 6
The second "but" part, giving the Congress the power of alteration, now
became the subject of a slight debate. Pinckney and Rutledge moved to
strike the entire clause because the states "could & must be relied on in
such cases;" Gorham responded it would be as improper to do this "as
to Restrain the British Parliament;" Madison gave the lengthiest reasons
for retaining the clause, giving first the impossibility of "foresee[ing]
all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power," and then
giving others; Rufus King, of Massachusetts, felt that if the Congress
did not have this power "their right of judging of the returns of their
members may be frustrated;" Gouverneur Morris "observed that the
States might make false returns and then make no provisions for new
elections;" and Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, "did not know but it
might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient con180 Id. II, 204.
181 Id. II, 202, thereby disagreeing with Dickenson, supra note 178.
182 Id. II, 204, and see n.17. Rutledge thought the proposed restriction "a very unadvised one. It would create division among the people & make enemies of all those who
should be excluded" (at 205).
183 Id. 1I, 204-05.
184 Id. II, 206, with one state (Maryland) divided, and one state (Georgia) absent.
185 Id. H-,216, only Mercer and Gorham speaking briefly.
186 See note 171, supra, for motion to restrict it to the House of Representatives, which
was defeated, whereupon it was now adopted. Id. II, 240.
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fidence in the State Legislatures." The motion to strike "did not prevail."' 7 With but a few language changes, the entire paragraph was
adopted without opposition. 8
The delegates now continued their examination of each recommended committee article and section, but found their pace too leisurely; they therefore appointed ad hoc committees, especially one of
eleven to report back to them on postponed as well as other items not
treated. The eventual frenetic haste of the delegates to complete their
labors resulted in the entire balance of nineteen articles and numerous
sections being discussed and voted upon by September 10th, just one
month after the adoption of the "but" clause giving Congress power to
make or alter the states' procedural regulations, and the entire body of
accepted material was turned over to a Committee of Style and Arrangement to re-draft for language and style."8 9 This committee undoubtedly
labored day and night, for on the second day (September 12th) it reported what the Journal stated was "the Constitution as revised and
arranged," and what Madison wrote was "a digest of the plan . . 190
Regardless, the document, as made available by Professor Farrand, is
now in the form and style of the eventual Constitution, with its art. I,
§ 2, cl. 1 containing the identical ratified language, and its art. I, § 4,
cl. 1 being only slightly amended. 9' This amendment, agreed to without
opposition on September 14th, was to add the exception clause to the
Committee on Style's version. 92
CONCLUSIONS
The examination of the language of art. I, § 2, cl. 1 and § 4, cl. 1,
of the Constitution permitted the hypothesis, if not the definite conclu187 Id. II, 240-41.
188 Id. II, 242, although one significant amendment introduced "made," eventually becoming "make" in the ratified Constitution, so as "to give the Natl. Legislature a power
not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should
fail or refuse altogether."
189 Id. II, 564, with Prof. Farrand compiling the proceedings referred to this Committee
at 565-580. At pp. 565 and 567 he gives the two paragraphs of present interest.
190 Id. 11, 582, 585.
191 Farrand, Records, supra note 135, II, 590, 592.
192 Id. II, 613, stating it was done "in order to exempt the seats of Govt in the States
from the power of Congress .... ." There is a slight question of spelling, Farrand giving the
Madison Notes as "except as to the places of choosing Senators," with the engrossed Constitution given at 653 spelling it "chnsing" (which is the spelling found in the one ratified).
See also III, 147, 195, 267, 344-5, for additional comments in other state ratifying conventions, and also 359 for Sherman's proposed constitutional amendment when he was a member
of the new government's House of Representatives (it failed). There is nothing in all
these references of aid in our present inquiry.
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sion, the Congress does not have power, simply by statute, to lower the
voting age to 18. The further examination of the English and colonial
backgrounds, as well as the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, fleshed out and unequivocally supported such tentative view.
The English experience discloses that while different ages may be found
at the common law for different reasons and purposes, 21 was the one
which dominated the consciousness of freeholders, freemen and others
as the age of maturity, legal ability, and the "right" to vote, assuming
other requirements were met; and, regardless of England's 1969 statutory reduction to 18 as the voting age, two hundred years ago the
colonists had 21 before them, and England has never been limited by a
written constitution. The colonists brought with them not only language
and customs but, insofar as this age pertained to like conditions, the use
of 21 as the age for voting; their charters and other documents are replete with this qualification.
Of great importance, however, is the situation with respect to the constitutions adopted by practically all the original and admitted states into
the Convention period-they explicitly set forth 21 as a voting requirement, and 21 was the age followed by Virginia. So, too, did the
Congress under the Articles of Confederation deal with its ceded territories by including "of full age" or "of age" in its statutes. So that in
the 1787 Convention there was no need to mention this (and also sex)
as a universal and normal qualification on the right to vote although
other qualifications might or might not be found, e.g., religion.' For
several valid reasons the delegates hesitated to give Congress power over
Athese substantive qualifications, but as to the procedural ones there were
193 The present constitutions of the fifty states are compiled by the Legislative Drafting
Research Fund of Columbia University in two loose-leaf volumes, published in 1962 with
supplements to December 31, 1967. The state constitutions are explicit with respect to
qualifications and many do contain 21, e.g., Alabama, , 34, § 177 of its constitution. Four
have, however, lowered the vote to 18, i.e., Georgia (in 1943), Kentucky, Alaska, and
Hawaii; constitutional amendments in twenty others have been rejected, e.g., Ohio, New
Jersey, Oregon; there are pending bills or resolutions for constitutional amendments in a
few others, e.g., New York; in one legal case an effort is being made to compel a state to
lower the age to 18 on fourteenth amendment Due Process and Equal Protection grounds (in
New York, as reported in N.Y. Times, May 6, 1970, p. 37, col. 2) ; and in other nations there
is, of course, great diversity, e.g., British Columbia has lowered it to 19, the first in Canada
(N.Y. Times, April 17, 1970, p. 8, col. 7), Switzerland is in the throes of its own great
debate. Which all adds up to a local ferment and hodge-podge which also existed in 1787
and has never been changed-save by constitutional amendment when sufficient desire and
pressure came through.
Is age "germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process"
(note 20, supra)? May "Minors ...be excluded" (note 22, supra) ?
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exceedingly good and sufficient reasons to include the "but" clause as
well as the exception to it. And, as seen, during the proceedings the
Hamilton suggestion, although concededly questionable, does include
specific mention of 21 in this context.
Throughout the Convention proceedings there seeps through an undoubted division of state and federal ultimate responsibility, with the
former bearing the burden of fixing the qualifications of the electors
(subject, of course, to subsequent amendments and the judicial use of,
e.g., the Equal Protection Clause), and the latter able to shoulder the
burden, when and if desired, of fixing the procedural details (as Congress has already done in certain respects). This division is frozen, sans
an amendment (as has occurred with respect to sex), and if permitted
to be violated by Congress then the evils felt by the Convention delegates to result if that body did not have control over the procedural
details are coin-face for the substantive ones.' 9 4
Which, in effect, all boils down to the supported conclusion that
Congress has no present Constitutional power 95 to lower the voting age

to 18.
194 Also, the concept of a federalism of two sovereigns with one people is weakened if
the people are split into separate classes of voters, as feared by Madison. And the principle
of checks and balances may well be analogously applied in this instance.
195 The emphasis throughout this article has been on power, not policy, so that one's
personal desires do not enter, e.g., even though the English change of 1969 to 18 as the voting
age was a policy decision of Parliament, able to be effectuated because there is no higher
limiting authority, their historic background is what the Founding Fathers and their
descendants lived and (at least in this respect) still live under; so that an English policy
change cannot determine American constitutional limitations. The same may be said of the
1969-70 reductions to 18 by the German Laender, and the probable aping by the Federal
Republic (and also of any other nation). See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(opening sentences of Justice Black's dissent) and West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (opening paragraph of Justice Frankfurter's dissent).

